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**COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, LABOUR MARKET
PERFORMANCE, WAGE STRUCTURES AND
POVERTY**

AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Thèse présentée en vue de l'obtention du grade de
Docteur en Sciences Economiques par
François RYCX LAMME d'HUISNACHT

Membres du jury

Directeur de thèse : Professeur Robert PLASMAN, Université Libre de Bruxelles

Jury restreint :
Professeur Christophe CROUX, Université Libre de Bruxelles
Professeur Claudio LUCIFORA, Università Cattolica de Milano
Professeur David MARSDEN, London School of Economics
Professeur Danièle MEULDERS, Université Libre de Bruxelles
Professeur Khalid SEKKAT, Université Libre de Bruxelles

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